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On January 21, 1924 V. I. Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik revolution and 
founder of the Soviet state, died of a cerebral hemorrhage. During the next 
three years Joseph Stalin consolidated his power over the Soviet state. In 1927 
he began preparing the Soviet Union to wage an aggressive war aimed at the 
heart of Europe, in order to advance Marx's prophesied world proletarian 
revolution. To achieve this, Stalin's government began the buildup of a massive 
military industrial infrastructure capable of producing vast quantities of 
weapons, and other equipment which could support a modern army waging 
aggressive warfare. To prepare for the anticipated war in Europe, the U.S.S.R. 
embarked on a revolution in military strategic thought, rapid industrialization, 
extensive expansion of infrastructure, and widespread economic and industrial 
espionage. Due to the development of new military theories by Tukhachevsky, 
Triandafillov and Snitko, as well as its vast expansion of military industrial 
infrastructure, the Soviet Union was transformed from an agrarian nation 
incapable of fielding a modern army, into a powerful industrial state capable of 
waging aggressive warfare. 
Background. Although the actual buildup of the Red Army began in 
1928, its philosophical underpinnings were rooted in the events of the October 
Revolution of 1917, and the Russo-Polish War of 1920. On November 7, 1917 
Lenin led a successful coup to topple the provisional government, which led to 
the founding of the world's first proletarian state. In the months and years 
following this coup Lenin's government was forced to engage in a civil war, 
which it won in early 1920. In 1920 the Polish Army under Marshal Joseph 
Pilsudski launched an offensive aimed at expansion into the Ukraine, but the 
Soviet Army led by Trotsky and Tukhachevsky launched a counterattack which 
drove the Poles back to within ten miles of Warsaw. Although infighting 
between Trotsky and Stalin ultimately cost the Soviet Union victory over 
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Poland, Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders believed that they had had a 
glimpse of the future. The Red Army had nearly succeeded in taking Poland, 
and in Western Europe various Moscow-led communist groups had launched 
work stoppages and strikes which crippled France and England's ability to send 
armaments to Poland. Until Pilsudski turned the Soviets back before Warsaw, 
delegates to the Second Congress of the Third International in session in 
Moscow followed with enthusiasm as the Soviet forces advanced. The situation 
in Western Europe was different; there the Germans saw the Soviet advance 
with great alarm, fearing that it could happen in their country.1 
In 1924 Lenin died and a power struggle ensued between Stalin, 
Trotsky, Zinoviev, and others, resulting on Stalin gaining complete control of 
the party and the state, with Trotsky exiled and ultimately assassinated, and 
Zinoviev executed as an enemy of the people. One of the chief contentions in 
this power struggle was what the future development of the revolution would 
be. Trotsky and Zinoviev favored revolutions, popular uprisings, and coups 
inspired by the Soviet model, and accused Stalin of abandoning world 
revolution. Although Stalin spoke of building socialism in a single state, he had 
no intentions of forgoing expansionist policies. In his preface to the book On 
the Road to October, Stalin wrote 
the victory of socialism in one country is not a self sufficient task. The 
revolution which has been successful in one country must not regard 
itself as a self sufficient entity, but as an aid ... for hastening the 
victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the 
revolution in one country ... is the ... beginning ... and pre condition 
for the world revolution.2 
After waging, and ultimately winning the battle for control of the 
Soviet State, Stalin purged the Communist Party of his opponents and set about 
transforming the Soviet Union into a modern industrial nation. Many of his 
critics, especially Trotsky, saw this as proof that he had abandoned world 
revolution; however in his report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, 
Stalin clearly had world revolution on his mind. This could be inferred when he 
said 
some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary crisis, the 
bourgeoisie is bound to get into a hopeless position, that its end is a 
1 George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917 - 1941 (New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, INC., 1960), 30. 
2 Joseph V. Stalin, Works. Vol. 6. 1924 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 
1953), 415. 
79 
foregone conclusion ... that is a profound mistake. The victory of the 
revolution never comes of itsel£ It must be prepared for and won.3 
During this plenum, Stalin attempted to portray his program as the construction 
of a technologically and culturally modern peace loving state; nevertheless Stalin 
was not able to completely conceal his ambitions of a worldwide revolution, as 
he prophesied how that the capitalist world would soon be at war, which he felt 
would ultimately lead to a revolutionary crisis. Even though Stalin implied that 
the aim of the Soviet foreign policy was to preserve the peace, he made 
something of a Freudian slip when he said "quite clearly things are headed for a 
newwar."4 
Transformation in Military Thought Leading to Industrializadon. 
Stalin was a pragmatist, who realized that global proletarian revolution could not 
be achieved by the efforts of the militant, but miniscule, communist 
organizations operating in nations across the world. He felt that the revolution 
needed a strong military vanguard to advance it, and as such he set about 
building up an ultra modern military. Stalin was aided in turning his dream of 
advancing the revolution into reality by three military strategists: Mikhail 
Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Triandafillov, and Nikolai Snitko. The most important 
of these was Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, Deputy Commissar of Defense 
and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. Tukhachevsky was a Bolshevik 
in his politics, and brilliant in military matters. In 1914 "Tukhachevksy passed 
out from the Alexandrovsky College as one of the best students in its history" 
and was commissioned lieutenant in Nicholas II's army; in 1915 he became a 
German prisoner of war, and in 1918 he joined the Red Guards during the 
Russian Civil War.5 Tukhachevsky first gained prominence during the march on 
Warsaw in the Russo-Polish War of 1920, when his army marched to within ten 
miles of Warsaw. Tukhachevsky, like so many other early Red Army 
commanders, was shaped by this battle. Shortly after the retreat from Warsaw, 
he declared that "the Communist International should set up a general staff for 
the executing of the \Vorld Revolution."6 
Tukhachevsky was a firm believer in revolution at the tip of the 
bayonet, and this is seen in his study called The Future War. This study examined 
3 Joseph Stalin, The Essential Stalin: Major Theomtical Writings, 1905-1952 (Garden City, 
NY: Anchor Books, 1952), 237. 
4 Ibid., 232. 
5 Harold Shukman, Stalin's Generals (London: Phoenix Press, 1993), 259. 
6 Lennart Samuelson, Soviet Dqense Industry Panning: Tukhachevskii and Military-Industrial 
Mobilization 1926 - 193 7 (Stockholm: Stockholm Institute of East European Studies, 
1996), 42. 
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the vulnerability to revolution of states which were likely to engage the Soviet 
Union in battle, and it outlined the steps that the Red Army had to take to win 
the coming clash. The Future War hypothesized two scenarios for the next war. 
In the first scenario the Soviet Union would be attacked by an imperialist power, 
and in the second "a successful social revolution in a 'major nation' would call 
for an armed intervention by the Red Army."7 In 1926, Tukhachevsky 
commissioned the Future War study by issuing orders to several Red Army 
departments, charging them with researching the strengths and weaknesses of 
likely enemy states' coalitions, and \v:ith examining the measures needed to 
guarantee victory in the coming conflict. Future War was comprised of six main 
parts, which covered ideology, enemy demographics, arm requirements, 
technological aspects of warfare, internal political factors of the states, and a 
summary of what was discussed before. This 1928 study was aimed at giving 
rational arguments for massive military investment, and it became the 
foundation "for the views of the military leadership concerning the economic 
development required for the new kind of warfare that was expected."8 
According to Raymond W. Leonard's Secret Soldiers ef the Revolution, 
Tukhachevksy's study predicted a long war of attrition using tanks, aircraft, 
machine guns, artillery, and vehicles which caused Soviet authorities to seek to: 
set in motion in peacetime the ability to produce military 
supplies and equipment in quantities greater than those 
consumed during the world war ... New weapons and military 
technologies needed to be researched or 'acquired,' tested, 
manufactured, and liberally distributed to combat units ... It 
was necessary to prepare transportation networks ... to 
support the massive movement of supplies for continuous 
operations. All of these tasks were urgent, for the Future War 
would likely come in a matter of a few years.9 
The goal was to either "crush" the enemy, or devastate "their material and 
human resources." This offensive doctrine was elaborated by Vladimir 
Triandafillov, and Mickhail Tukhachevsky. 
General Vladimir Triandafillov was Chief of Operations and Deputy 
Chief of the Soviet General Staff. In 1929 Triandafillov wrote Nature ef the 
Operations ef Modern Armies. In this, the author seemed to focus on the 
beginning, or the first period of a future war, and the strategies that would be 
7 Ibid., 48. 
8 Ibid., 178-9. 
9 Samuelson, Soviet Defence Industry Planning, 49. 
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necessary.10 Triandafillov's work is divided into two parts. The first part 
evaluates the development of military equipment following the First World War, 
possible numerical strength of mobilized armies, and organization. The second 
part covers operations of modern armies including premises, operations, and 
successive operations. Triandafillov began by discussing the armament 
developments following the First World War in western nations, to encourage 
similar developments within the Soviet Union. He suggested that chemical 
weaponry, tanks, and aviation were the most crucial weapon developments of 
the First World War. Triandafillov encouraged the development of chemical 
weapons because "they promise the most surprises in a future war," and most 
importantly: 
defensive equipment lags behind offensive equipment. Extant filters 
are applicable only to the toxic agents known today. There are no 
guarantees against new secret chemical weapons. Moreover, the present 
state of affairs concerning protective clothing is completely 
unsatisfactory. 
He highly valued the role of tanks, and this is seen when he wrote that: 
No one today doubts the great tactical significance of tanks for a future 
war ... Suppressive assets (artillery) lag behind defensive assets which 
promote tanks as one of the mightiest offensive assets for a future 
war. 11 
He supported tanks because they are fast, well armed, and highly mobile. In a 
time when airpower theory was being developed by persons such as the 
American Colonel William Mitchell, British Marshal Arthur Harris, and Italian 
General Giulio Douhet, Triandafillov called for the development of a modern 
air force complete with formations of reconnaissance, pursuit, and bomber 
aircraft. 
Triandafillov thought that the quality of an army was going to be more 
more important than its sheer number in troops. The quality was reflected in 
the possession of modern weaponry and motorization. He stated that "the 
shock force of these armies manifests itself in a large number of high-speed 
tanks, motorized artillery, and combat aviation."12 The mechanization of the 
10 V.K. Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modem Armies, (Portland: Frank Cass 
and Co. LTD, 1994), 7. 
11 Ibid., 20 - 27. 
12 Ibid., 27. 
armed forces would serve to both strike the "vital centers of the enemy 
country" and "hurl the enemy back" while seizing its territory. 
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Triandafillov also envisioned a war involving clashes between million-
man armies, predicting the armament of "virtually the entire able-bodied male 
population," whom would be called up into the army. He predicted that the 
U.S.S.R. would win the coming war because the: 
Soviet state ... has every reason to rely upon the broad toiling masses, 
but the capitalist world must consider the 'unreliability' of these masses 
and undertake mass mobilization with certain circumspection, certain 
constraints, and additional measures.13 
The unreliability of the masses in the armies of the capitalist world would lead 
to problems for the capitalist nations because "primacy in war will go to the side 
employing high technology and able to field the larger army at the front," 
which meant that the capitalist states would have to worry about dissent 
amongst the members of their large armies and large industrial work forces. 
The next war was going to require such a great number of ammunition and 
military equipment that "the entire metallurgical industry of even the most 
powerful capitalist countries fully mobilize and shift to 'defense' work." This 
transition of industry to full scale defense buildup signified a reduction of 
commercial supplies for the civil population, which would cause great stress on 
the industries. This was likely to result in a revolutionary situation, because 
dissatisfaction against the capitalist classes would undermine the capitalist states 
at the front, and in the rear. Triandafillov concluded that the Soviet Union 
would win the coming conflict because it could arm and fight a total war with 
the full support of its citizenry, whereas the capitalist world could not.14 
Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov's plans for offensive war were 
supported by the head of GOSPLANs (State Planning Committee of the 
U.S.S.R.) Military Division, Nikolai M. Snitko. In March 1930, Snitko wrote a 
memorandum in which he discussed three likely scenarios of war between the 
Soviet Union and its capitalist enemies.15 In the first type of war, the Soviet 
Union would be attacked by an imperialist power. In the second variant the 
Soviet Union would ally with one camp of imperialist powers against another 
camp, and in the third variant: 
13 Ibid. 
provided there existed a revolutionary movement in capitalist society 
and the Soviet Union had a sufficiently solid economic and political 
14 Ibid., 45- 47. 
15 Samuelson, Soviet Defence Industry Planning, 112. 
basis, plus the necessary military preparedness (the Red Army would) 
launch 'an armed attack on capitalism.16 
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Snitko focused mainly on the first variant, which previewed the U.S.S.R. 
being attacked first. He believed that victory in the coming conflict implied "a 
total crushing of the enemy's armed forces and state apparatus, and the 
subsequent transformation of these countries to 'Soviet Republics."' To enable 
such an offensive, Snitko called for a great expansion of the Red Army and the 
Air Force. IIis plan involved a "maximum effort," in which he argued for a Red 
Air Force of between 25 to 30,000 airplanes, half of which were attack and 
light bomber planes, which were supposed to be "in front-line service at the 
start of the war. Tank requirements in Snitko's scenario were equally shocking 
as he called for "15000 light and 7000 heavy tanks at mobilization."17 Snitko's 
call, along with those of Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov, for a fully mechanized 
army and powerful air force required full scale industrialization. Therefore, it is 
not by accident that the five year plans started the same year, 1928, that 
Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov, and Snitko reported their findings to Stalin. 
The First Five Jear Plan began in 1928 and lasted until 1933. 
Ostensibly, the First Five Year Plan was intended to build a model socialist state; 
however, the plan was also intended for the "preparation for another world 
war," with the totality of the industrial buildup "geared to military needs."18At a 
time when the United States, Great Britain, and France were engaged in 
disarmament and Germany was still six years from launching full scale 
rearmament, the Soviet Union was building a modern military and the 
infrastructure with which to support it. The First Five Year Plan was meant to 
prepare the U.S.S.R. for the type of warfare envisioned by Tukhachevsky, and 
other leading military strategists, and in terms of output alone it was highly 
successful. In 1934 the rest of Europe combined had 500 tanks whereas the 
Soviet Union was manufacturing 170 tanks per year by 1930, and 3,509 tanks 
per year by 1933.19 The Soviet Union was also building more combat aircraft 
than the rest of Europe combined, and one commentator stated in 1935 that 
the peace loving people of the Soviet Union had more bombers at their 
disposal than anyone else on the planet. Before the five year plans began, the 
NKVM (People's Commissariat for :Military and Naval Affairs) was allocated 
less than fifteen percent of the annual Soviet budget, but by the conclusion of 
the First Five Year Plan, the NKVM received nearly twenty three percent of the 
16 Ibid., 113. 
17Jbid., 113-114. 
18 Richard Pipes, Communism: A History (New York: Random House, 2001), 58. 
19 Mark Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938 -1945 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 8. 
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state budget.20 In addition to the copious quantities of tanks, aircraft, artillery, 
machine guns, rifles, and ammunition produced during the First Five Year Plan, 
the foundation for a colossal armaments industry was laid. In his report to the 
Seventeenth Party Congress on January 26, 1934, Stalin proclaimed the First 
Five Year Plan a success, because the Soviet Union had been "radically 
transformed ... New industries have been created," which involved "the 
production of machine tools, automobiles ... chemicals, motors, aircraft, 
harvester combines, powerful turbines and generators, high-grade steel, ferro-
alloys."21 
As implied by Stalin's speech, one of the aims of the First Five Year 
Plan was "to transform the Soviet Union from a country importing equipment 
into a country that manufactures equipment." In 1933 GOSPLAN published 
the Summary of the Fulftllment of the First Five Year Plan, which provides an 
overview of the achievements of the First Five Year Plan. In 1928 the Soviet 
Union trailed most of Western Europe and the United States in the 
manufacture of industrial machinery, but by 1931 the Soviet Union was second 
in machine production behind only the United States. Machine building created 
"a powerful base for the technical reconstruction of the ... economy and for 
the defense of the country." The large volume of industrial equipment the 
Soviet Union constructed enabled it to build a base for mass production of 
armaments and other goods, as they assured "the precision ·without which the 
modern conveyer methods of assembly based on the interchangeability of parts 
would be impossible."22 
In 1933 GOSPLAN reported that the First Five Year Plan resulted in 
the creation of a firm base "for the defence of the country."23 Furthermore, 
GOSPLAN proclaimed that "one of the most important results of the First 
Five Year Plan is that the U.S.S.R. has been transformed from an agrarian 
country into an industrial country." In a handbook written for prospective 
American investors, ~\1TORG recorded the enormous achievements made 
during the First Five Year Plan. The Soviet Union tripled iron ore production 
from six million metric tons in 1928, to fifteen million metric tons in 1933. Pig 
iron production doubled from three million metric tons in 1928, to six million 
20 David R. Stone, Hammer and F.ijle: The MilitariZfition of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 90. 
21 Joseph V. Stalin, lf7orks, Vol. 13 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 
1953), 314. 
22 State Planning Commission of the U .S.S.R., Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five 
Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R (Moscow: State 
Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R, 1933), 65. 
23 Ibid., 64 69. 
metric tons in 1933. Steel production rose from eight million metric tons in 
1928, to nearly twelve million metric tons in 1933. Manganese production 
escalated from 710 thousand tons in 1928, to more than one million tons in 
1933. Electricity was needed to fuel industry, and electricity production tripled 
from five million kilowatts in 1928, to sixteen million kilowatts in 1933. 24 
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Electrification was needed to give the Soviet Union a modern industrial 
base, and GOSPI.Al'ls Summary ef the Fulfilment ef the First Five Year Plan 
elaborated on this, as it expounded on the significance and development of the 
U.S.S.R's electrical grid. It stated that "the first plan for the industrial restoration 
and reconstruction of the economy of the country was the plan of 
electrification." It continued by saying that the development of electrical 
infrastructure resulted in the doubling of the capacity of power stations 
between 1928 and 1932, and a tripling of output during the same period. 
Summary stated that the increase in electrical production was based on the 
construction of new district power stations. GOSPLANs report emphasized 
that "in 1928 there were eighteen district stations in the U.S.S.R. with a total 
capacity of 610,000 kw," and "by the end of 1932, forty-three district stations 
were working with a total capacity of 2,624,000 kw."GOSPLAN credited the 
construction of these power plants in assisting the development of Soviet 
industrial complexes, because they reduced "the need for the building of special 
power plants at factories." By 1932, the Soviet government was able to boast 
that the capacity of Soviet power stations was better utilized than their western 
counterparts. One of the chief benefits of electrification was the supplying of 
sustainable energy sources to provide for: 
the mechanization of a number of highly labor absorbing industries, 
particularly the coal industry; the mechanization of all the main 
operations at the metallurgical works; the introduction of the conveyer 
system in the machine building industry; the organization of the 
manufacturing of ferro-alloys, of high grade steel, aluminum, etc.25 
Fuel was as vital as electricity for building the Soviet Union's military 
and industrial infrastructure. According to GOSPI.Al'\l, the development of the 
"entire economy of the country during the first Five-Year Plan period 
depended" on "the development of the fuel base of the Union," for the 
continued improvement of industry. During the First Five Year Plan the Soviet 
Union nearly doubled fuel production. In 1932, the total supply of fuel 
"amounted to 110.6 million metric tons ... as compared with 56.8 million tons 
24 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook of the Soviet Union (New York: 
American Russian Chamber of Commerce, 1936), 130, 200. 
25 State Planning Commission, Summary of the Fu!filment of the First Five Year Plan, 85 -97. 
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in 1927-28." Coal production increased from 35,250,000 tons in 1928, to 
62,983,000 tons in 1932. In order to fuel tanks, planes, trucks, ships, and 
industry, the Soviet Union needed oil, and stemming from this need petroleum 
production was emphasized during the First Five Year Plan. The number of oil 
wells increased from 4,760 in 1928 to 5,986 in 1932, which allowed for a 
doubling of petroleum production. In reviewing the results of the First Five 
Year Plan, GOSPIAN stated that: 
the big successes attending the development of the fuel industry ... 
ensure the further development of the power resources to the extent 
required for the completion of the technical reconstruction of the 
economy of the country as a whole.26 
In addition to powering Soviet industry, developments of new fuel sources were 
vital to establishing a firm transportation infrastructure. 
Transportation infrastructure, crucial in moving troops, weaponry, 
food, and supply in wartime, was rapidly increased during the First Five Year 
Plan. Five thousand new miles of railroad track were laid out, and freight traffic 
increased from 150 million tons in 1928, to 268 million tons in 1933. Water 
transportation showed significant increases during the First Five Year Plan, as 
river freight nearly tripled from eighteen million tons in 1928, to fifty two 
million tons in 1933. This increase was facilitated by the construction of several 
canals, including the 'White Sea-Baltic Canal, and Moscow-Volga Canal. 
Although the amount of paved roadways in the Soviet Union still lagged behind 
Europe, after the First Five Year Plan road construction increased "the total 
length of all roads suited for any kind of vehicular traffic from 24,300 
kilometers ... to 41,000 kilometers." During the same time there were 
substantial increases in overland freight traffic, and the number of automobiles 
in the Soviet Union increased from 18,700 in 1928 to 179,500 in 1934.27 The 
epicenters for the Soviet Automotive industry were the Stalin Automobile 
Works in Moscow, the Molotov Automobile Works in Gorky, and the Yaroslavl 
Works in Yaroslavl. Because the Red Army needed trucks to transport its troops 
and supplies, it is not surprising that "a distinguishing feature of the Soviet 
automobile industry is the large proportion of trucks that are turned out," and 
by 1933 GOSPIAN claimed that "the Soviet automobile works" could 
"produce approximately as many trucks as were produced in 1929 by all the 
automobile works in Europe combined."2S The First Five Year Plan resulted in 
stupendous increases in the production of railroad equipment. In 1928 the 
26 Ibid., 98 - 108. 
27 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, 240, 259. 
28 State Planning Commission, Summary of the Fulfilment of the First Five Year Plan, 78. 
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Soviet Union produced 479 locomotive engines per year, and by 1932 this 
number was 827 per year. The Soviet Union built 9,130 freight cars in 1928, and 
by 1932 this number was 21,612. 
Because of its vast distances, the U.S.S.R. benefited heavily from 
aviation. During the First Five Year Plan Soviet civil aviation networks increased 
from a little over 10,000 kilometers to more than 43,000 kilometers. While civil 
aviation made modest strides during the First Five Year Plan, military aviation 
benefited the most. According to the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce, the Soviet Union relied heavily on imported airplanes and motors 
before 1928, situation that was changed during the first Five-Year Plan. It stated 
that "at the present time practically all planes in service ... are of domestic 
make."29 The First Five Year Plan enabled Soviet authorities to boast that: 
the production of airplane motors, both air and water-cooled, has been 
organized, and motors up to 700 hp., are now being built. All types of 
modern planes for civil and defensive purposes are now manufactured 
in the U.S.S.R ... Important research and experimental work in airplane 
construction is carried on at three aviation institutes. The foremost of 
these is the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGl) in 
Moscow.30 
During this time the Soviet Union established several design bureaus, most 
notably Polikarpov, Ilyushin, Petlyakov, Tupolev, Antonov, Sukhoi, Lachovkin, 
and Mikoyan and Guryevich. These built planes that flew nonstop over the pole 
from Moscow to San Francisco, giants such as the Maxim Gork), heavy bombers 
such as the TB-3, medium bombers such as the DB-3, advanced fighters such as 
the I-16, and dirigibles. 
Along with the development and expansion of transportation 
infrastructure in the First Five Year Plan period came the development of radio, 
telegraph, and telephony. Communications infrastructure was important for 
linking the distant population centers of the Soviet Union, as well as for 
improving the command, control, and communication systems of the Red 
Army. GOSPLANs Summary of the 1-<u!ftlment of the First Five Year Plan details the 
enormous gains made in the Soviet communication infrastructure. The Soviet 
government proclaimed that "the total length of interurban telegraph and 
telephone lines in 1934 reached 1, 870,000 km,, as compared with ... 890,000 
km. in 1928." The advancement of telephony allowed for rapid communication 
across the Soviet Union and between the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the world. 
Radio usage saw gigantic gains as the "number of radio receiving 'points' rose 
29 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, 267. 
30 Ibid. 
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from 348,000 in 1928 to 2.3 million in 1934." The Soviet government 
encouraged the development of "an extensive system of local amateur 
stations." There was also considerable development of shortwave radio, and the 
"Moscow radio-telegraph center is the fourth largest in the world."31 Although 
the development of these communication systems served to link the distant 
population centers of the Soviet Union, they also assisted in military 
communication. The Moscow radio-telegraph center was used before the 
abolishment of the Komintern in 1938, to communicate with Soviet agents 
involved in fomenting uprisings and coups across the globe. During the Second 
World War it was used to communicate with the British and American 
governments, as well as with the various departments of the Red Orchestra spy 
ring to communicate intelligence reports from Berlin, London, and Tokyo to 
the Stavka (Soviet General Staff Headquarters). 
Obtaining Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance. The 
Soviet Union needed to acquire capital from the nations of Europe and the 
United States to finance the construction of an advanced military-industrial 
infrastructure. The need for foreign money was extreme because "the fund of 
foreign exchange in the Soviet Treasury was woefully inadequate for the first-
line industrial departments."32 One of the ways in which SOVNARKOM 
obtained capital was by selling Soviet grain. SOVNARKOM also sought 
funding by normalizing trade relations with the rest of the world, and to do this 
the U.S.S.R. established several trading companies such as ARCOS (Anglo 
Russian Shipping Company) and AMTORG (American Trade Organization). 
Although AMTORG and ARCOS were used as front organizations by the 
NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and the GRU (Military 
Intelligence) for espionage purposes, they were also successful in obtaining 
foreign capital. AMTORG and other Soviet trade consortiums were able to 
collect nearly 50,000,000 dollars from foreign investors in 1928, with 7,150,000 
dollars of that sum coming from the United States.33 In 1929 AMTORG 
published a prospectus giving a general idea of the possibilities, character, and 
dimensions of the foreign trade relations of the Soviet Union in the next few 
years."34 Pavloff's pamphlet stated that "capital investments in industry 
31 Ibid., 271 -.273. 
32 Walter G. Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service: Memoirs of the First Soviet Master Spy to Defect 
(New York: Enigma Books, 2000), 102. 
33 Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, and Rexford G. Tugwell, Soviet Russia in the Second Decade: 
A Joint S urvry l!J the Technical Staff of the First American Trade Union Delegation (New York: 
The John Day Company, 1928), 348. 
34 Joseph M. Pavloff, The Upbuilding of Soiiet Russia: Five-Year Plan for Industrial Development 
of the Soviet Union (New York: AMTORG Trading Corporation, 1929), 1. 
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enumerated in the plan will become effective only towards the end of the five 
year period or even later." In 1936 an AMTO RG subsidiary, The American-
Russian Chamber of Commerce, published The Handbook of the Soviet Union. The 
book was a guide to foreign investors and was meant to "provide an 
authoritative basis upon which to build an understanding of the Soviet trade, 
industry, and agriculture in recent years."35 Although the Soviet Union was 
somewhat successful in attracting foreign investors and raising funds for 
industrialization through legal means, Stalin's government also pursued money 
in more illicit ways. Perhaps the most infamous case of Stalin's questionable 
fundraising was his counterfeiting scheme. Stalin's government counterfeited 
American currency, mostly 100 and 500 dollar bills, and "put into circulation 
throughout the world about ten million dollars in bogus American currency."36 
Another questionable way in which the Soviet Union acquired foreign currency 
was what was called, the "Dollar Inquisition," which implied a "systematic 
extortion from Soviet citizens of relief remittances" sent by their relatives living 
in the U.S. Many were "imprisoned and tortured by the OGPU until ransom 
money arrived from abroad."37 
In addition to acquiring money, Soviet industrial development 
necessitated the acquirement of foreign technology, technical assistance, and 
equipment. AMTORG was crucial in procuring American tank technology. 
According to Leonard, 
(In) October 1928 ... I.A Khalepski, a leading Soviet tank expert and a 
close friend of Tukhachevsky's, entered the United States on a visa 
arranged by AMTORG. His declared purpose was to negotiate a deal 
with the Ford Motor Company.38 
Khalepski spent considerable time in the United States visiting arsenals and 
examining American military technology, and "during his stay he became 
familiar \Vith the work of J. Walter Christie, who was experimenting with a series 
of advanced tank design prototypes that incorporated an innovative suspension 
system." Christie's tank designs excited American and Polish interest, and when 
Christie developed a new design known as the Mt 930, AMTORG was 
determined to acquire it for the Red Army. In 1930 ~\.fTORG was able to 
outbid the Polish government for the revolutionary Ml 930 Christie tank. 
Initially, the American government was reluctant to provide the Soviet Union 
with the tank, but the AMTORG representatives were able to convince 
35 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, xxiii. 
36 Krivitsky, In Stalin's Secret Service, 101-2. 
Ibid. 
3B Leonard, Secret Soldiers ef the Revolution, 110. 
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Congress that they intended to use the Christie for agricultural purposes. To 
complete the deal, Christie shipped two Ml 930s to the Soviet Union 
"completely equipped and ready to fight except for mounting the gun," in crates 
labeled tractors. Wben the Ml 930 reached the Soviet Union it became the basis 
of the BT family of tanks, and its suspension system became incorporated into 
the superb T-34 medium tank. 
AMTORG was able to convince American industrialists to erect factory 
complexes within the U.S.S.R., and proclaimed that the use of "American 
equipment and engineering techniques" were very important for the 
development of Soviet cars and tractors. Ford Motor Co. was one of the 
American companies that contributed to this development. Foreign technical 
assistance was crucial to Soviet military buildup and: 
beginning in 1928, more than two-score contracts were concluded with 
American engineering concerns providing for the cooperation of the 
latter in the design, construction operations of mines, electrical plants 
and installations, and industrial enterprises of the U.S.S.R ... In 
addition, hundreds of individual engineers and technicians were 
engaged for various Soviet industries.39 
The leading American firms in providing technical assistance to the Soviet 
Union, the Ford Motor Company, RCA, DuPont, Curtiss-Wright, and General 
Electric, and other western corporations, were extremely interested in investing 
in the Soviet Union because during the tumultuous economic downturn of the 
early 1930s, the U.S.S.R. promised a safe market. Although Stalin's government 
owned all foreign built and operated factories within the Soviet Union, foreign 
companies granted leases to build industrial complexes v.iithin the U.S.S.R., and 
were guaranteed "the repayment of capital invested ... and a certain amount of 
profit."4° Furthermore, Western investors were intrigued by contracts with the 
Soviet authorities granting the U.S.S.R. ownership of the industrial complexes, 
while granting themselves ownership of raw materials, finished products and 
money. The Soviet Union was an appealing target for Western investment 
because nations like Great Britain could sell to it large amounts of raw materials 
from its colonial holdings, while other nations such as France, Italy, and the 
United States enjoyed cheap labor, and extremely favorable balances of trade, as 
the fledgling Soviet state imported much more than it exported.41 Germany had 
a darker motive for seeking strong trade relations with the Soviet Union, as it 
39 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, 164, 375-6. 
40 Grigory Grigoryan, What, How, and W~? The Young Soviet State and Foreign Investments 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1966), 34. 
41 American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, 326-340. 
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could build up large amounts of armaments, flouting limitations placed on it by 
the Versailles Treaty. 
Conclusion. Born out of Stalin's dream for Soviet Expansion and the 
military genius of Tukhachevsky, Triandafillov, and Snitko, the First Five Year 
Plan transformed Soviet Russia from a backwards, agrarian, and militarily weak 
nation into a fully industrialized militarily superpower. The call of Stalin and his 
military commanders for an aggressive war utilizing a highly mechanized army, 
and incorporating large numbers of planes, tanks, and artillery required the 
Soviet Union to establish a formidable armaments industry and the 
infrastructure needed to support it. The First Five Year Plan allowed the Soviet 
Union to outpace the rest of the world combined in combat aircraft, artillery, 
tank, and small arms production by its conclusion in 1933. Production of steel, 
iron, copper, aluminum, manganese, magnesium, potash, and coal, vital to the 
establishment of an armaments industry, experienced tremendous growth. 
Dozens of new cities and hundreds of new industrial complexes sprang up, 
providing the U.S.S.R. with the basis for an extensive military-industrial 
infrastructure. Transportation and communications systems were greatly 
expanded as hundreds of miles of canals were dug, thousands of miles of new 
track were laid, tens of thousands of miles of roads were paved, hundreds of 
radio stations were built, and several thousand miles of telephone wires were 
posted. The accomplishments of the First Five Year Plan paved the way for the 
advances of the second and third Five Year Plans. Despite great loss of human 
life, chaos, and confusion, the First Five Year Plan achieved its aimed military 
production. During the execution of the First Five Year Plan the Soviet Union 
was able to obtain foreign financial and technological assistance for its 
industrialization program, and was greatly aided in this by its extensive 
espionage network, which allowed it to acquire weapons systems such as the 
Christie Tank. 
The industrial, transport, communication, and military infrastructure 
established during the First Five Year Plan allowed for the rapid technological 
development of the Soviet military. This fact was reflected by the Peoples' 
Commissar for Defense Kliment Voroshilov's speech in December 1939, on the 
occasion of Stalin's sixtieth birthday which praised the five year plans for the 
"industrialization of the country." Voroshilov continued his praise for the five 
year plan by stating that "It is only thanks to this that our army is now 
technically better equipped than any other army in the world." Although 
Triandafillov died in a plane crash in 1931, and Snitko and Tukhachevsky were 
eliminated during the purge of the Red Army High Command in 1937, the 
military strategies and the industrial infrastructure they helped create allowed 
the Red Army to survive the perilous days of 1941, and achieve ultimate victory 
at Berlin in 1945 while Sovietizing half of Europe in the process. \Vhile writing 
his memoirs in the late 1960s, Marshal Georgi Zhukov said that the five year 
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plans were instrumental in developing the Red Army into "an up-to-date army 
that measured up to the latest standards." 
At\1:TORG 
ARCOS 
GOSPLAN 
GRU 
NKVD 
NKVM 
OGPU 
SOVNARKOM 
TsAGI 
Appendix A: Abbreviations and Terms 
American Trade Organization 
All-Russian Co-operative Society 
Gosudarstvemryi Komitet po Planirovanryu, State 
Committee for Planning 
Glavnf!Ye Razye4Jvate!nqye Uprav/enrye, Main 
Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army 
Narodtryi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, People's 
Commissariat For Internal Affairs 
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Narodtryi Komissariat Voentrykh i Morskikh Del, Peoples 
Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs 
Ob'edinennoeGosudarstvennoe,Politicheskoe Uprav/enie, Joint 
State Political Directorate 
Sovel Narodtrykh Komissarov, Council of Peoples 
Commissars. Nominal Government of the Soviet 
Union, functioning as a cabinet of ministers 
Tsentral'tryi Aerogidrodinamicheskii Institut, Central 
Aerohydrodynamic Institute 
Appendix B: Tables 
Soviet Weapons Production, 1930 - 1933 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Combat Aircraft n/a 220 146 627 
Bombers n/a 100 72 291 
Fighters n/a 120 74 336 
Tanks 170 740 3,038 3,509 
Artillery Pieces 952 1,966 2,574 4,638 
Medium and Large Caliber 608 926 1,602 1,754 
Machine Guns 9,700 41,000 45,000 32,700 
Rifles; Carbines, in thousands. 126 174 224 241 
Source: Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace and War, p. 250. 
Soviet Heavy Industry Output, 1928-1933 
1928 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Iron ore, in million metric 6.0 7.8 10.4 10.9 12.2 15.1 
tons 
Pig Iron, in million metric 3.4 4.3 5.0 4.9 6.2 7.2 
tons 
Steel Ingots, in million metric 4.3 4.9 5.8 5.4 5.9 6.9 
tons 
Rolled Steel, in million metric 3.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 4.2 4.9 
tons 
Manganese Ore Output, in 710.0 1,237.0 1,543.0 876.0 833.0 1.040.0 
thousand metric tons 
Coal, in million metric tons 35.5 40.1 47.8 56.8 62.8 76.3 
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Petroleum, in million metric 11.6 13.7 18.5 22.4 21.4 21.5 
tons 
Electricity, in billion kilowatt 5.0 6.2 8.4 10.7 13.5 16.4 
hours 
Motor Vehicles, in thousands 0.8 1.7 4.2 4.0 23.9 49.7 
of units 
Sources: Iron and Steel: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 
131; Manganese: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 139; 
Coal, Petroleum, Electricity and Motor Vehicles: Harrison, Soviet Planning in Peace 
and War, p. 253. 
Soviet Transportation and Communications Development 
1928 1933 
Length of rail lines in Operation, in thousands of 76.9 82.6 
kilometers 
Volume of Railroad Freight Traffic, in millions of tons 150.6 268.1 
Freight carried on inland waterways, in million tons 18.3 46.9 
Length of Usable Roads, in thousands of kilometers 24.3 41.0 
Aviation lines, in thousands of kilometers 11.4 37.0 
Length of Interurban Telegraph and Telephone Lines, in 890,000 1,870,000 
kilometers 
Sources: Railroads: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 240; 
Inland Waterways: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 251; 
Paved Roads: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 259; 
Civil Aviation: American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Handbook, p. 264. 
